# ICANN Domain Metrica & INFERMAL

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**ICANN OCTO-SSR** 



GAC: Discussion on DNS Abuse ICANN 82

March 2025

# Agenda

**ICANN** Domain Metrica

INFERMAL project



A system to **collect**, **combine** and **compare** any metadata related to domain names.

The platform has a **dynamic dashboard** with relevant **statistics** and visualisations; alongside an API to access raw data.

# **ICANN Domain Metrica**

- Data and statistics for **gTLDs** and **registrars**
- Searchable for gTLDs, registrars and domains [get Metadata and statistics]
- Shareable **domain-level** data
- Interactive visualisations and comparisons [allows to filter on dates and add gTLDs to compare]
- Abuse map abuse hosts geolocation [Maxmind data]
- Domain Popularity Ranking [Tranco list]
- MoSAPI
  - Access to lists of reported domains (contracted parties)
- A separate API for the rest of the ICANN community

### **ICANN Domain Metrica - Use Case I**

We suspect the domain "flagylone24.top" to be involved with abuse

Search in the UI

### Background

CANN 🕡 Domain Metrica		Siôn 💄
Search Fields marked with * are required Select Domain, Top-level Domain (gTLD), or Registrar * Domain	<u>Clear</u> Search	
flagylone24.top		
Registrar NameCheap, Inc. Created Date 11 Jul 2024 Expiration Date 11 Jul 2025 NS Records beau.ns.cloudflare.com. itzel.ns.cloudflare.com.	IP Addresses       104.21.44.198         (28 Feb 2025)       172.67.203.104         2606:4700:3031:0:0:0:ac43:cb68       2606:4700:3033:0:0:0:6815:2cc6         Signed? false       Image: Signed State Sta	

# **ICANN Domain Metrica - Use Case I**

#### **Current Reported Abuse**

Last updated 06 Mar 2025

Summary of the latest reported abuse updated daily

	Type one count
surbl Phishing	1

### Popularity of domain

Current active reports

#### **Tranco Popularity Ranking**

A Research-Oriented Top Sites Ranking Hardened Against Manipulation 🛈

Click the chart title to download, compare, or change date range



## **ICANN Domain Metrica - Use Case II**

### What do we know about the TLD "com"? Select Domain, Top-level Domain (gTLD), or Registrar \* TLD Search in the UI <u>Clear</u> Search com com Last Updated 06 Mar 2025 **Zone Size** 154,482,406 Registry http://www.verisigninc.com Size Change (since 05 Mar 2025) +23,510 Background Type generic Number of Signed Delegations 6,359,930 Delegation Date no data available

#### **Current Reported Abuse**

Summary of the latest reported abuse updated daily

Reported Abuse Type	Unique Domain Counts	Percentage of Total Zone Size
Phishing	204,574	0.132%
Malware	2,158	0.001%
Botnet C&c	555	0.000%

# Current Reported Abuse

Last updated 06 Mar 2025

### **ICANN Domain Metrica - Use Case II**

### **Reported Abuse Trends**

Hosting locations





### **ICANN Domain Metrica**

 RBL Name
 Reported Abuse Type

 Select
 Select

Note: the list shown here will not contain all reported domains. The number of results we can return is limited by our license agreements, we also only display fresh reports, that is, reports first seen in the previous 7 days. See the FAQ for more details.

#### 1 - 20 of 446 results

Last updated 06 March 2025

Domain	RBL Name	Reported Abuse Type 🕈	URL Count
-	spamhaus	Botnet C&C	1
-	spamhaus	Botnet C&C	1
	surbl	Malware	1
	spamhaus	Malware	1
	spamhaus	Malware	1
	spamhaus	Malware	1
	surbl	Phishing	1
-	surbl	Phishing	1
		< Previous 1 2 3	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Next >

# Shareable domain-level data

(For registry and registrar users only)

- Domain Metrica is not "finished"
  - It is planned to evolve through its existence
  - Reflect feedback, new use cases, *etc.*
  - Build on what we have
- Yearly evaluation of the inputs lists we use [using our RBL evaluation methodology **OCTO037**]

Want to know more?

Metrica homepage: https://www.icann.org/octo-ssr/metrica-en

DASC webinar on ICANN Domain Metrica (4 December 2024): <a href="https://community.icann.org/display/ccnsowkspc/ccNSO+Webinars">https://community.icann.org/display/ccnsowkspc/ccNSO+Webinars</a>

# INFERMAL

Inferential Analysis of Maliciously Registered Domains

![](_page_10_Picture_2.jpeg)

A project funded by ICANN

Led by Professor Maciej Korczyński (KOR Labs / Université Grenoble Alpes)

Looked at registration policies to reveal patterns in attacker preferences at TLD-registrar level

Final report was published in November 2024

More details and further links can be found at: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/inferential-analysis-maliciously-registere d-domains-infermal-2024-12-03-en Features examined included Registration Attributes, *e.g.*:

- Pricing
  - Cost of registration
- Discounts
  - Fixed or percentage reduction in advertised cost, *e.g.* on "bulk" registrations
- Bulk registration facilities
  - Ability to search multiple domains in one interaction
- Free API availability
  - How much automation is possible (without subscription)
- Payment methods
  - Cryptocurrency, pay-pal, etc.
- Free services
  - Web hosting, email, TLS certificates, etc.

. . .

And also Verification and security practices, *e.g.*:

- Validation of contact details
  - e.g. email/physical address, phone number checked before domain purchase
- Registration restrictions
  - *e.g.* any documentation required, local presence
- Domain string check
  - e.g. attempt to register "office365-my-account"
- Measure domain "uptimes"
  - how long to reported domains remain active (reactive measure)

### **INFERMAL**

Datasets

- Phishing
  - APWG, PhishTank, OpenPhish
- Benign domain names
  - ICANN CZDS, Google CT logs, etc.
- Features
  - TLD-List (*e.g.*, domain registration costs, discounts, free features) \*
  - Manually collected data (*e.g.*, free API, API create user account, API register domain, restrictions)
  - Active measurements (uptimes)
- Active WHOIS and DNS measurements

\* https://tld-list.com/

# **INFERMAL**

Strongest correlations with **increasing** abuse were

- Free API availability
- Free DNS / hosting
- Registration discounts

Strongest correlations with decreasing abuse were

- Validation on email address / phone number
- Presence of registration restrictions

Likely that attractiveness to attackers results from a combination of factors.

Essential to consider economic implications, impact on legitimate users and the likely response of attackers to adjustments.

We would like to extend our thanks to Professor Maciej Korczyński and his team.

# **Engage with ICANN**

![](_page_16_Picture_1.jpeg)

# **Thank You and Questions**

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